Recent headlines have once again thrust the AUKUS partnership into the public eye, specifically following the announcement that Australia will acquire three Virginia class submarines already in United States service. This adjustment to the original plan—which anticipated two used submarines and one newly built vessel—has generated significant public discourse. However, separating factual analysis from political rhetoric is essential for understanding the strategic, financial, and operational realities of this defense capability agreement. Drawing on expert insights from defense specialists, including those at The University of Western Australia, this article examines the concrete reasons behind Australia’s acquisition of used submarines and what it means for the nation’s future defense posture.
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The Strategic Rationale Behind Acquiring Used Submarines
Understand the current state of the Royal Australian Navy’s submarine fleet to grasp why purchasing used submarines is not a compromise, but a necessity. Australia currently operates the Collins class submarines, with vessels entering service between 1996 and 2003. Decades of delayed replacement programs and chronic underfunding have left the fleet aging rapidly. Although each Collins class submarine is undergoing multi-year maintenance periods designed to extend its operational life, these measures are only temporary stopgaps. The reality is that these vessels will require decommissioning before Australia can independently design, build, and deploy its own nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS pact.
This timeline creates a critical capability gap. To maintain a credible submarine force and protect maritime borders, Australia requires an interim solution. Procuring three Virginia class submarines scheduled for delivery in 2032, 2035, and 2038 provides the necessary bridge. Military planners refer to this as a “crawl, walk, run” approach. The Virginia class submarines represent the “walk” phase, allowing the Australian Navy to build institutional knowledge, train crews, and establish operational protocols for nuclear-powered submarines before attempting to “run” by constructing the domestically produced SSN-AUKUS fleet.
Acquiring submarines that are already active in the US fleet significantly reduces both risk and complexity. This strategy bypasses the myriad challenges associated with integrating a brand-new vessel into service, including the rigorous and time-consuming initial certification trials required for unproven platforms.
Assessing the Combat Capability of Virginia Class Submarines
A common misconception surrounding the recent announcement is that Australia is receiving inferior or obsolete technology. Analyze the actual specifications of the vessels to see that this is not the case. While the third submarine will be an older variant—meaning its sensors may be slightly less advanced than the newest models—Australia is still receiving three Block IV Virginia class submarines. These vessels remain among the most capable attack submarines currently operating anywhere in the world.
Each Virginia class submarine in this acquisition carries a formidable arsenal, including more than 20 torpedoes and 12 Tomahawk land strike missiles. Recent media commentary has incorrectly suggested that Australia is losing vital missile capacity because these specific submarines will not feature the Virginia Payload Module (VPM)—an additional hull section designed to increase missile loadouts. However, the submarine originally slated for delivery in 2038 was never intended to possess the VPM capability. Furthermore, the United States has explicitly stated it is not willing to export the VPM technology.
In a high-intensity conflict scenario, Australia would primarily deploy these submarines in anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare roles. The additional land strike capacity provided by the VPM, while useful, is not essential for these primary missions. Another point of confusion involves the remaining operational lifespan of these vessels. Critics have falsely claimed the used submarines will only have eight years of service left. The Australian Submarine Agency has confirmed before Senate estimates that each vessel will have more than 20 years of operational life remaining upon transfer. Given that the specific Block IV variants entering service only began production in 2020, the math supporting the 20-year figure easily withstands scrutiny.
Breaking Down the $368 Billion AUKUS Price Tag
Examine the financial arguments against AUKUS, and you will frequently encounter the figure of $368 billion. While technically accurate, presenting this number without context is misleading. This figure is not the cost of three used submarines. Instead, it represents the total projected expenditure through to 2055. It encompasses the purchase of the Virginia class submarines, the design and construction of the future SSN-AUKUS fleet, and massive investments in infrastructure, workforce development, and sustained maintenance over a 31-year period.
Of this $368 billion, approximately $244 billion represents the base projected cost. The remaining $122.9 billion is a 50% contingency fund. In defense procurement, contingency budgets are standard practice, designed to absorb cost growth, unforeseen technical problems, and macroeconomic risks. Most conventional defense projects carry a contingency of only 5–10%. The exceptionally high 50% contingency attached to AUKUS reflects the unprecedented scale and complexity of the program.
Contextualize these numbers using the Department of Defence’s 2026 Integrated Investment Program. This document states that nuclear-powered submarine acquisitions will cost between $71 billion and $96 billion over the next decade. When measured against projected total defense funding of roughly $887 billion over the same timeframe, the submarine program accounts for approximately 8% to 11% of overall defense spending—a proportionate investment for a critical strategic capability.
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Navigating US Industrial Base Constraints and Production Rates
Identify the most legitimate concern surrounding the AUKUS agreement, and you arrive at the capacity of the United States submarine industrial base. Following the end of the Cold War, the US significantly reduced its submarine production rates. Although the US set a goal in 2011 to build two submarines per year—averaging 1.9 boats annually between 2016 and 2019—this rate has recently declined. Workforce shortages exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with the engineering challenges of transitioning to the larger Block V variant, have caused production to drop to approximately 1.3 submarines per year.
To meet its own strategic goals and fulfill the AUKUS agreement, the US must eventually reach a production rate of 2.3 submarines per year by 2054. Recognizing this bottleneck, the US government is investing billions of dollars to expand its industrial base and train a new generation of skilled shipbuilders. US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle recently testified before Congress, projecting that Virginia class production will return to two boats per year around 2032. While the industrial base challenges are substantial and require sustained effort to overcome, it is notable that the US has not signaled any intention to renege on its commitment to sell submarines to Australia if production targets are delayed.
Weighing the Risks of the AUKUS Program
Acknowledge that AUKUS carries significant risk, because any objective analysis demands it. This initiative stands as the most complex defense project in Australian history. Risks permeate every facet of the program, from the industrial capacities of the US and UK, to the rapid expansion of a highly specialized workforce, to the development of critical infrastructure and long-term funding stability. Dismissing these risks is not a credible position.
However, measuring the program’s progress against its ambitions reveals substantial achievements in less than five years. Australia has successfully established a future submarine base near Perth, embedded Australian personnel within US and UK submarine programs, commenced major infrastructure works, trained hundreds of naval personnel in nuclear propulsion principles, and secured the necessary US congressional approval for the transfer of the Virginia class vessels. Following the recent AUKUS Defence Ministers’ Meeting, all three partner nations reaffirmed that the program remains on track. Adjustments, such as the shift to three used submarines, are natural evolutions in a multi-decade program, not evidence of fundamental failure.
The Consequences of Abandoning the AUKUS Agreement
Consider what would happen if Australia decided to abandon AUKUS due to these risks. The nation cannot simply terminate the agreement and purchase a different submarine off the shelf. Any alternative would require launching an entirely new acquisition process, negotiating a new international agreement, and enduring years of diplomatic and bureaucratic delays.
Furthermore, there is no obvious replacement available. France’s nuclear-powered submarine program, for example, relies on a single shipyard with a production timeline exceeding a decade for a single vessel. If Australia were to abandon a second major submarine program in little over a decade—first the French Attack class contract, and now AUKUS with its closest allies—it would severely damage its international reputation. It would be difficult to imagine any other nation willing to partner with Australia on a future defense project of this magnitude. Our reputation for reliably delivering on complex naval acquisitions is already under pressure.
Scrutiny of AUKUS remains healthy and necessary, but that scrutiny must remain anchored in verifiable facts. Those who propose abandoning the program bear the burden of explaining exactly what alternative would replace it and how Australia would avoid a devastating submarine capability gap. Officials from partner nations frequently express less concern about US or UK industrial capacities than they do about Australian political will. Maintaining a measured, fact-based public debate is crucial for the long-term success of this national security imperative.
